On 10 September 2026, version 2026-09-10-v11 of the Terms of Service and version 2026-09-10-v12 of the Privacy Policy replace 2026-08-24-v10 and 2026-08-24-v11. Most of the changes correct sentences that described the software wrongly, the way the last version did. Some of them are different: they change what the software does, and each of those closes a hole where a measure, a sign-out or a deletion did not hold. You can end the agreement free of charge within 30 days — it is set out at the end of this notice.
Signing a device out from somewhere else now takes the device off the account. Until now it ended that device's session, and a device you had asked us to remember signed itself straight back in on the next page load, because the wrapped account code was still on its disk. The screen said the device had been signed out, and for a remembered device that was not what happened. From this version the server records that a session was ended rather than that it expired, and a remembered device that is told its session was ended forgets what it was remembering. An ordinary expiry still does nothing of the kind — you are not asked to type your account code again every day. Nothing is kept for longer because of this: the session row is removed on the same schedule as before.
A suspension no longer washes off by deleting the account and making it again. If we stop serving an account under sections 12.5 or 12.8, the measure lived in the account row and died with it — and an account identifier is derived from your account code, so the same person could delete and re-create and be back. From this version the measure is recorded on its own and outlives the account, exactly as a board bar already does and for the same stated reason. The row holds which account, which reason, and the day it ends where there is one. It holds nothing you wrote. The Privacy Policy no longer counts what deleting your account does not reach: it names each such record and says why it outlives the account, and this measure is one of them.
What happens to your deletion if we ever restore from a backup. A restore brings the database back as it was when the copy was taken, so an account deleted after that copy would come back alive — and nothing would have deleted it again, because we keep no list of deletions and that is deliberate. From this version we find those accounts a different way, without writing anything new down about anyone: before the service opens again we compare the accounts in the restored copy against the accounts in the newest copy we hold, and an account that is in the older one and not in the newer one is deleted again, through the same code your own deletion runs. What that still cannot reach is a deletion made after the newest copy we hold. Copies are written hourly, so that is the width of what is left, and section 8-A says so rather than rounding it off.
A second Sui node service, and why you are hearing about it before it starts. Your browser reads the blockchain through an RPC service, and the Privacy Policy names the ones we chose and promises to say here, before the change, if any of them changes. From this version there are two: Suiscan, a product of Staketab, which is asked as it is today, and PublicNode, operated by Allnodes Inc., which is asked only for a request Suiscan did not answer — no reply at all, a failure on its side, or a refusal for too many requests. That last one can happen while Suiscan is healthy. Once a request has gone to PublicNode, the part of the app that made it keeps asking PublicNode for as long as that part lives — a part built once for the page lives until you reload it or open NMTS again; a part built for one action, an upload for example, starts again at Suiscan each time — including after Suiscan is healthy, because nothing goes back to check. The second service exists so that reading a balance or paying for an upload does not simply fail while the first is down. What reaches whichever one answers is what reached the first one before: your IP address, your wallet address, and the contents of the transactions you sign or the balances you read. Neither of them can read a file. The command-line tool and the recovery tool carry the same pair.
A daily check on the storage we bought for you, and a record when it is gone. For an upload paid with credits, our treasury buys the storage. From this version our server takes a sample of that storage once a day and asks the chain whether it is still there — and asks again, every day, about each object it has already missed. Where the chain answers that it no longer knows an object, a row pairs your account with that object and the day the check first could not find it, the drive shows it to you, and this board posts the day's finding from that record without naming anyone. A day the chain could not be read writes nothing, and an object the chain knows but we could not recognise is counted for us to look at, not written against you. A row comes off when a later check finds the object, twelve months after the first miss, or with your account; the incident itself stays in a register that names the object and not you. If you would rather not be shown losses on one purchase, or on any of yours, you can say so: we take the line down and write no more of them against you, except where the law itself requires that you be told of a high-risk incident, and the machine makes that judgement before anyone else does. The Privacy Policy describes it in sections 2.8, 5.1, 8, 10.6 and 13.6.
Keys you can issue to a program, which the documents did not list. Since 23 August an account can issue API keys — credentials for a program acting for you, such as an assistant or a script. The Privacy Policy calls its section 2 the complete list of what our server holds, and the keys were not in it. They are now, in full: what a key row holds, what the human check that lifts a key's tighter limits holds, that the short code you type is stored only as a hash, and that the counter of accounts created through a key records how many and not which. So are the retention periods: a key lives at most 90 days and for as long as you chose within that, a revoked or expired key is kept a further 30 days so that a program waking up later is told the key was revoked rather than that it never existed, and all of it goes when you delete your account. The Terms add two paragraphs: what handing your account code to a program actually gives it, and that a key is the way to avoid doing that. A key cannot open your files.
The support inbox, and a protection we had not written down. Since 9 August the text of a support message has been sealed inside the database under a key our server holds. The Privacy Policy listed the places we hold a key — the connection and the backups — and closed that list by saying there was nothing else. The inbox was a third. The new version names it, and says exactly what the sealing does and does not do: a copy of the database on its own does not open it, and the key is on the server, so it protects the message from someone who takes the database and not from someone who takes the server.
The length we store for a piece of a file. The Privacy Policy said we hold the plaintext length of each storage part. Since 18 August we hold the sealed length instead — the number of bytes actually stored — and the plaintext number is not recorded at all. The two differ by an amount that depends only on the size: sealing adds a 72-byte header once per part and a 16-byte authentication tag for every 4 MiB inside it. The document claimed more collection than happens; the new version says what is really there.
The recovery list — its name, and a setting that was missing. What the documents called the recovery map has been called the recovery list in the product since 17 August; the documents now use the product's name. And the account record carries one setting the Privacy Policy did not list: whether you asked for your recovery list to be stored on the storage network alongside your files, so that your account code alone is enough to recover them. It is off unless you turn it on, because turning it on buys storage paid from your own wallet, and we will not put you to an expense through a default you never looked at.
Releasing storage you paid for with credits. The Terms described this as something you email us about. A screen has done it since the button shipped: you ask on the file's own screen and we destroy the storage object and show you the transaction. The new version says so, keeps email as the fallback, and names the fee that request may carry — it is 0 today, and the screen states the figure before you confirm, so the number charged is the number you were shown. It also says plainly that releasing the storage and deleting the file are two separate acts.
Two smaller corrections, and some sentences taken out. The encryption engine's published source moved from the GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 to the Apache License, Version 2.0 on 30 August; both documents name the licence, and the name is what changed — the sentence's job, and what publishing does not prove, are the same. The Terms' account-deletion section said one record is not deleted; there are several, so the section now lists what deletion removes, and the Privacy Policy's retention table names what outlives the account. The European 14-day withdrawal right now says what it does not undo: a gift you already sent, because it is a right to withdraw from a purchase and a gift is not one — what a law you cannot contract out of gives you about a gift is untouched, and a gift made by a minor is the case that clause is written for. We have also removed eleven sentences in which we praised our own honesty rather than saying anything: they were not obligations and not facts, and a document is easier to trust with them gone.
Where our own server reads the chain from this version, and why you are hearing it before it starts. Your browser's calls do not move: Suiscan, PublicNode and the Mysten Labs relay and aggregator stay as named. The calls our server makes that name a storage object of yours — the payment for a credit-paid upload and the release of that storage, the daily check on the storage we bought and a re-check you ask for — go from this version to a Sui RPC service run by Nodeinfra Co., Ltd., a company in Seoul, Korea, answering from servers in Germany; and the read our server makes to measure whether a stored piece is really there goes to a Walrus aggregator run by Bware Labs, a company in Bucharest, Romania, answering from servers in Germany. What our server asks about our own wallet and about public prices — balances, which coins to pay with, the price of storage — still goes to Suiscan, the one Sui RPC service our server is configured with for that; the price of storage is read once more through Nodeinfra while a payment is being built. Our server has no fallback service: when the service a call is made to does not answer, that call fails; the switching between Suiscan and PublicNode is your browser's, not our server's. On the main network our server software refuses to start unless it has been given exactly these services, so the destinations named here are not left to a setting. Privacy Policy 9.4 names each of them and says why: Korea is a country the European Commission has found adequate, and Germany is inside the European Economic Area, so those calls no longer rest on a ground the policy had to hedge. The one leg that carries only our own wallet address and public prices goes to Suiscan, whose operator does not publish the country its infrastructure runs in, so the policy states none for it. The policy promises to say here, before the change, if any of these services changes; this is that telling.
What the last check changed. Before this notice, every citation in both documents was matched against the text of the law it cites, and that check moved some sentences. The United Kingdom is now named wherever the documents spoke of the European Union and meant both — the withdrawal right, the transfer rules, the complaint routes — and the British provisions are cited by their own names, because they stopped matching the European ones this year. A stopped account keeps the way to its files: with your account code and a saved recovery list, the recovery tool retrieves them from the storage network without us; if you saved none, you write to us with your public code and we serve the account again for 14 days so that you can download them, at no charge, and then the stop resumes. The sentences that said the recovery tool did not exist yet are corrected — it has been published since 17 August. A notice of an incident on this board stays up for at least 30 days, not 15, the period the Privacy Policy already gave. A report of material that sexually exploits children needs no contact details. Where a binding legal order requires a measure the Terms do not otherwise take, we follow the order. And the sentence promising the law and the courts of your own country now says where the sources we hold back it — the European Union, the United Kingdom and Korea — and leaves the rest to your own country's rules.
The 30-day right, and where to read. You can end the agreement free of charge within 30 days of the later of 10 September 2026 and the day this notice first reached you. Ending the agreement does not touch your files — Terms 16.2 — and 15.6 says what it does and does not do. Both documents are on the site in English and in Korean; from 15 September the new versions stand in their place, and the versions they replace stay published with their effective dates. The button at the top of this notice saves it as a dated file in both languages, and nmts@nmts.me will send the exact text of any version within seven days.